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In July 2016, parents at Assumption Catholic School in a small 
city in Washington learned that the school had failed to inform them 
about the presence of a registered sex offender parent for nearly a 
year.1 Although school officials established strict policies regarding 
the supervision of the parent while on school grounds, they decided 
against informing the families of all the students.2 In the 1980s, this 
parent was convicted of molesting two girls under the age of twelve in 
South Dakota.3 In 2002, he was convicted for abusing two other girls 
in Washington.4 By 2008, he was charged again with molesting two 
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more underage girls.5 This time, the charges were dropped due to a 
lack of sufficient evidence.6 A few years later, he married a woman 
who gave birth to his daughter.7 In 2015, their daughter started 
attending preschool at Assumption.8 The following year, one of the 
mothers at the elementary school started pairing up new families with 
more established ones in order to create a “buddy system.”9 When a 
family declined to be paired up with the sex offender’s family, the 
mother decided to search for answers on the Internet.10 To her horror, 
she found out that the man who had been visiting the school on a daily 
basis was a registered sex offender.11 The school principal somehow 
concluded that because the preschool was separate from the other 
schools, the notification of parents outside of the preschool was 
unnecessary, especially since the sex offender was only on campus for 
a “very, very brief” time.12 Several parents found the presence of a 
known sex offender and the “moderate risk” that he would reoffend 
too much to bear and decided to withdraw their children from the 
school.13  
This worry is exactly what Wisconsin legislators sought to address 
when they passed Section 301.48 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which 
requires lifetime GPS monitoring of serious child sex offenders.14 The 
relevant portion of the statute states: 
 
(2) Who is covered . . .  
(b) Except as provided in subs. (7) and (7m), the department 
shall maintain lifetime tracking of a person if any of the 










14 WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2006). 
2
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following occurs with respect to the person on or after 
January 1, 2008 . . .  
2. A court discharges the person under s. 980.09 (4). This 
subdivision does not apply if the person was on supervised 
release immediately before being discharged.15 
 
The above provision of the statute applies to sexually violent 
persons who were released from civil commitment.16 The language of 
980.09(4) states: 
 
If the court or jury is satisfied that the state has not met its 
burden of proof under sub. (3), the person shall be discharged 
from the custody of the department. If the court or jury is 
satisfied that the state has met its burden of proof under sub. 
(3), the court shall proceed under s. 980.08 (4) to determine 
whether to modify the person’s existing commitment order by 
authorizing supervised release, unless the person waives 
consideration of the criteria in s. 980.08 (4) (cg). If the person 
waives consideration of these criteria, the waiver is a denial 
of supervised release for purposes of s. 980.08 (1).17 
 
A recent case involving this statute, Belleau v. Wall, tells the story 
of Michael Belleau who was convicted of multiple sexual assaults of 
minors.18 After spending years in prison, in jail, and on probation, he 
was committed to a secure treatment center as “a sexually violent 
person” under Chapter 980 of the Wisconsin Statutes.19  
 
“Sexually violent person” means a person who has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated 
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found 
                                                 
15 § 301.48(2)(b)(2). 
16 Id. 
17 WIS. STAT. § 980.09(4) (1994). 
18 Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 2015). 
19 Id. 
3
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not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense 
by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or illness, and 
who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage in 
one or more acts of sexual violence.20 
 
In 2010, he was released from civil commitment wearing a GPS 
tracking device on his right ankle.21 By then, Belleau’s sentences had 
expired, and he was not under any form of supervision.22 If the 
lifetime monitoring was part of his sentence as punishment for his 
crimes, the story would have ended here.23 “Given the fact that one 
can be sentenced to life in prison for such a crime, it necessarily 
follows that lifetime GPS tracking, as a component of a sentence 
imposed for such an offense, would be lawful.”24 Similarly, the 
monitoring would have been acceptable if it was a condition of his 
release.25 The United States District Court Eastern District of 
Wisconsin declared that the statute was an ex post facto law because it 
applied to Belleau retroactively and because it was punitive in effect.26 
Judge Griesbach further held that the monitoring program was not a 
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.27  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
overturned the decision and declared that the statute did not violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the monitoring was 
considered “prevention,” not “punishment.”28 It also decided that the 
statute did not offend the Fourth Amendment because a search under 
the circumstances was reasonable, and the Amendment only prohibits 
                                                 
20 § 980.01(7). 
21 Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1090. 
22 Id. at 1093. 
23 Id. at 1092. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1104. 
27 Id. at 1109-10. 
28 Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016). 
4
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unreasonable searches.29 After all, people like Belleau “have a 
diminished right of privacy as a result of the risk of their 
recidivating.”30 
Despite having the best interests of children in mind, GPS 
monitoring laws have the potential to infringe upon the constitutional 
rights of offenders. Part I of this paper takes a closer look at the 
background of lifetime satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders. 
Part II focuses on the procedural history of Belleau v. Wall and reviews 
the contrasting opinions of the district court and the Seventh Circuit. 
Lastly, Part III discusses the current state and the constitutional 
implications of lifetime tracking programs. 
 
I. SHOULD STATES MONITOR SEX OFFENDERS FOR LIFE? 
 
The majority of victims do not report sexual abuse.31 This is 
especially true when the victims are minors.32 Children often have 
difficulty describing what happened to them.33 Though they may 
provide hints, these are easily missed by adults.34 Other times, children 
are simply too afraid to talk, either because they don’t know how their 
parents will react or they worry that their abusers may retaliate.35 The 
younger the victim, the more likely the crime goes unreported.36 In 
light of these facts, it is not hard to imagine that many children grow 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 935. 
31 DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L SEX OFFENDER PUBLIC WEBSITE: RAISING 
AWARENESS ABOUT SEXUAL ABUSE FACTS AND STATISTICS, 
https://www.nsopw.gov/(X(1)S(asm1fvbvnzx3szfwiqa13rtf))/en-





36 Roger Przybylski, Chapter 5: Adult Sex Offender Recidivism (Sex Offender 
Management Assessment and Planning Initiative NCJ 247059, Oct. 2014), 
http://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec1/ch5_recidivism.html (last visited Jan. 29, 
2017). 
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up without access to adequate treatment and that, in turn, increases the 
likelihood of anxiety, depression, substance abuse, and even suicide.37 
Even with treatment, the psychological and physical scars remain for 
many years, if not forever.38 Victims are more likely to run into 
problems in school and have difficulty holding onto jobs as adults.39 
They may even become child abusers themselves.40 
The high rate of recidivism further exacerbates the problem.41 
Because of the significant underreporting of these crimes, it is 
particularly difficult to properly estimate how high the recidivism rates 
are among child sex offenders.42 Pedophiles with more than one prior 
arrest are two or three times more likely to repeat their crimes.43 The 
National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) sponsored a study that examined 
the effect of satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders in California.44 
The study “found that those placed on GPS monitoring had 
significantly lower recidivism rates than those who received traditional 
supervision.”45 In fact, 38% more arrests were recorded in the group 
                                                 
37 Understanding and Preventing Child Abuse and Neglect, AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/understanding-child-abuse.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
38 Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, DARKNESS TO LIGHT, 
http://www.d2l.org/atf/cf/{64AF78C4-5EB8-45AA-BC28-
F7EE2B581919}/Statistics_5_Consequences.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
39 Child and Adolescent Psychiatrists, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, 
http://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/FFF-
Guide/Child-Abuse-The-Hidden-Bruises-005.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
40 Sexual Abuse, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, 
http://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/FFF-
Guide/Child-Sexual-Abuse-009.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
41 Przybylski, supra note 36. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Philip Bulman, Sex Offenders Monitored by GPS Found to Commit Fewer 
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under traditional supervision as opposed to the group wearing GPS 
monitors.46 
With these statistics in mind and given the states’ well-recognized 
compelling interest in protecting children from physical and 
psychological harm, it is understandable why many states have 
enacted statutes requiring the satellite-based monitoring of sexual 
predators.47 A few of the states even provide for lifetime monitoring.48 
Nonetheless, legislatures should not overlook the constitutional 
implications of these programs. The Seventh Circuit analyzed both the 
Fourth Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause to determine that the 
Wisconsin statute was constitutional. 
 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution is to protect people from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.49 As the word “unreasonable” suggests, not all searches are 
prohibited.50 Determining what is reasonable is usually not simple and 
may involve the balancing of the right of individuals “to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against legitimate 
government interests.51 
In Grady v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court reviewed the case 
of Torrey Dale Grady, a two-time sex offender subjected to North 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 
(1989); Warren Richey, GPS monitoring of sex offenders for life? Supreme Court 
reverses N.C. case, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (March 30, 2015), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/0330/GPS-monitoring-of-sex-
offenders-for-life-Supreme-Court-reverses-N.C.-case-video. (1989). 
48 Richey, supra note 47. 
49 What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?, United States Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-
educational-outreach/activity-resources/what-does-0 (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
50 Id. 
51 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Carolina’s lifetime satellite-based monitoring program.52 Grady argued 
that the tracking device violated his right to be free from unreasonable 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.53 The North Carolina courts 
rejected his argument relying on the theory that “the State’s system of 
nonconsensual satellite-based monitoring d[id] not entail a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”54 
In its decision to reverse the lower court, the Supreme Court cited 
two of its prior cases that were inconsistent with this reasoning.55 In 
United States v. Jones, the Court concluded that attaching a GPS 
tracking device to a vehicle was a search because the government 
physically entered a constitutionally protected space.56 In Florida v. 
Jardines, the Court held that taking a drug-sniffing dog onto a person’s 
porch was also a similar physical intrusion that fit well within the 
definition of a Fourth Amendment “search.”57 
Next, the Court reviewed the text of the North Carolina statute, 
which required the monitoring to provide “[t]ime-correlated and 
continuous tracking of the geographic location of the subject” and 
“[r]eporting of subject’s violations of prescriptive and proscriptive 
schedule or location requirements.”58 Based on this language and the 
two prior cases, the Court declared that attaching “a device to a 
person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that 
individual’s movements” was in fact a “search.”59 The only question 
left for the lower court to answer on remand was whether the search 
itself was reasonable.60 
                                                 
52 Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1369 (2015). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1370. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)). 
57 Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 
(2013)). 
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When law enforcement obtains a judicial warrant before 
conducting a search, it is generally considered reasonable.61 When law 
enforcement operates without a warrant, courts review the 
reasonableness of the search by examining the totality of the 
circumstances.62 Specifically, the court will evaluate the level of 
intrusion on the reasonable expectation of privacy of the person being 
searched and the character and purpose of that search.63 
The Supreme Court in Grady did not review whether this type of 
statute may be applied retroactively to an offender who completed 
serving his sentence.64 Some state courts have answered in the 
negative.65 “According to these courts, the monitoring law’s adverse 
effects are so punitive that they negate whatever civil intent was 
envisioned by state legislature.”66 
 
B. The Ex Post Facto Clause 
 
The Constitution of the United States proscribes the enactment of 
retroactive laws through the Ex Post Facto Clause.67 There are actually 
two such clauses in the Constitution.68 One is in Article I Section 9, 
which applies to the federal government, and another is in Article I 
Section 10, which applies to the states.69 In Calder v. Bull, the 
Supreme Court announced four circumstances when the clauses are 
implicated:70  
 
                                                 
61 Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1105 (D. Wis. 2015). 
62 Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1370. 
65 Lance J. Rogers, Lifetime GPS Monitoring Is Constitutional, CRIMINAL LAW 
REPORTER (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.bna.com/lifetime-gps-ankle-n57982066905/. 
66 Id. 
67 Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)). 
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1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing 
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and 
punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, 
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every 
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater 
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of 
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the 
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in 
order to convict the offender.71 
 
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether a state may subject 
a convicted sex offender to lifetime GPS tracking retroactively. The 
Court did address the ex post facto implications of a civil commitment 
statute in Kansas v. Hendricks, a law that is cited as most similar to the 
satellite-based tracking program statutes.72 In 1994, Kansas enacted 
the Sexually Violent Predator Act to mitigate the risk recidivist sex 
offenders pose to public safety.73 In the same year, Leroy Hendricks, 
who had an extensive history of sexually abusing minors, was about to 
be released to a halfway house.74 The State asked the court’s 
permission to place him under civil commitment.75 The trial court 
granted the State’s request and held that pedophilia fit the definition of 
“mental abnormality” described in the statute.76 In his appeal, 
Hendricks attacked the statute on an ex post facto basis, among other 
claims.77 The Court discussed the dangerousness of pedophilia and the 
                                                 
71 Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2081 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 390). 
72 See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.2d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997)). 
73 Id. at 351. 
74 Id. 354-55. 
75 Id. at 355. 
76 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994) (“’Mental abnormality’ means a 
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which 
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting 
such person a menace to the health and safety of others.”); id. at 355-56. 
77 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350. 
10
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statute’s narrow focus on well-defined offenders in detail.78 Because 
the statute lacked punitive legislative intent, because it only applied to 
a narrow class of dangerous offenders who were unable to control 
their urges, because procedural safeguards required the periodic 
judicial review of the appropriateness of ongoing confinement, and 
because the statute required the offender to undergo treatment, the 
Court declared that the civil commitment statute was not punitive.79 
If GPS tracking is found comparable to civil commitment, the 
Supreme Court may similarly label it “prevention” when it finally 
decides an ex post facto challenge in a case involving this type of 
monitoring. Some state courts disagree with this theory. In Riley v. 
New Jersey State Parole Bd., the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
reviewed the ex post facto implications of the State’s Sex Offender 
Monitoring Act (“SOMA”) passed in 2007.80 George Riley was 
“convicted of the second-degree attempted sexual assault of a minor” 
in 1986.81 Because of his prior sexual assault convictions, he was 
sentenced to twenty years.82 Six months after his release, the New 
Jersey Parole Board advised Riley that, pursuant to SOMA, he would 
have to wear an anklet monitor for the rest of his life.83 The Appellate 
Division reversed the decision of the Parole Board and declared that 
the statute violated federal and state ex post facto laws.84 The Parole 
Board appealed arguing that Riley was subject to monitoring not 
because of his past crimes but because of his “present 
dangerousness.”85 The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected this 
argument because Riley’s 1986 conviction was the reason behind this 
designation.86 The court held that the monitoring program was no 
                                                 
78 Id. at 357-60. 
79 Id. at 368-69. 
80 Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 275 (2014). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 274. 
84 Id. at 278-79. 
85 Id. at 281. 
86 Id. at 291. 
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different than parole, even though Riley was not under any court 
ordered supervision.87 The court recognized that the legislature 
intended to pass a nonpunitive statute, but it found the law to be 
significantly punitive in effect, therefore, in violation of the “the Ex 
Post Facto Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.”88  
The Seventh Circuit decided to follow a different approach and 
rejected both the Fourth Amendment and ex post facto violation 
arguments in Belleau v. Wall. 
 
II. BELLEAU V. WALL 
 
In 1992, Michael Belleau was found guilty of sexually assaulting 
an eight-year-old boy multiple times during a period of five years, 
starting around 1987.89 Despite the severity of his crimes, his sentence 
was only one year in jail and five years on probation.90 While on 
probation in 1994, he was tried and convicted of the sexual assault of 
another child, a nine-year old girl, which took place in 1988.91 This 
time, his punishment was an additional ten years in prison.92 
Nevertheless, he was paroled again after six years.93 By October 1, 
2001, a year after his release, Belleau was back in prison.94 His parole 
was revoked after he revealed his desire to molest two additional 
children.95 Before he finished serving his latest sentence, the State of 
Wisconsin petitioned to place him under civil commitment as “a 
sexually violent person.”96 Belleau spent the next six years at the Sand 
                                                 
87 Id. at 294. 
88 Id. at 297-98. 
89 Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 2015). 
90 Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2016). 





96 Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) (1994)). 
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Ridge Secure Treatment Center in Mauston, Wisconsin.97 In 2010, Dr. 
Richard Ellwood, a psychologist at the facility, concluded that Belleau 
no longer met the definition of “a sexually violent person” under the 
civil commitment statute.98 As a result, he was going to be released 
again.99 
While Belleau was under civil commitment, the Wisconsin 
legislature passed Wis. Stat. § 301.48, which requires the Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to continue monitoring the 
locations of persons who committed serious sexual offenses against 
children following their release from involuntary civil commitment 
under Chapter 980.100 Shortly after Belleau was released from the 
Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, DOC agents detained him 
“without any warrant or other court order” and secured a GPS device 
on his right ankle.101 Belleau was “required to wear the GPS device 24 
hours per day, seven days a week, for the rest of his life.”102 Although 
the device is waterproof, it may cause skin irritation and has to be 
charged about one hour every day.103 Moreover, technicians may need 
to visit Belleau’s home periodically to replace the batteries in the 
device.104 The anklet itself is fairly large, requiring the wearer to put 
on long pants to hide it from plain sight.105  
The law requires the DOC to create individualized inclusion 
zones, which the offender is prohibited from leaving, and exclusion 
zones, which he is prohibited from entering except to pass through, if 
needed to protect the public.106 The DOC is not required to define such 
zones for maximum discharge registrants, “those who have completed 
                                                 
97 Id. at 1088. 
98 Id. at 1089. 






105 Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2016). 
106 WIS. STAT. § 301.48(3)(c) (2006). 
13
Torres: The Seventh Circuit Justifies Lifetime GPS Monitoring by Calling
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
148 
and been discharged from their sentences and/or commitments.”107 
While Belleau was not subject to an exclusion zone at the time of his 
trial, the statute left the creation of the zones in the hands of the 
DOC.108 He was not monitored in real time, but a DOC employee 
reviewed his whereabouts every night.109  
Belleau appeared pro se in front of the United States District 
Court Eastern District of Wisconsin to contest the constitutionality of 
the statute.110 Recognizing the importance of Belleau’s challenge, the 
court advised him to retain an attorney.111 “In view of the significance 
of the issue Belleau has attempted to raise and his obvious lack of 
legal training and difficulty in even naming and serving the proper 
party, it would appear that this might be an appropriate case for the 
court to consider recruitment of counsel to represent him.”112 
Following the court’s advice, Belleau retained attorneys who 
submitted an amended complaint on his behalf claiming that the GPS 
monitoring statute violated the Ex Post Facto clauses, the Fourth 
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.113 
 
A. The District Court Agreed With the Defendant 
 
The district court did not question the need for the GPS 
monitoring statute. “Given his prior convictions, Dr. Ellwood’s 
diagnosis of pedophilia, and the impact of sexually assaultive crimes 
on children, few would not want to take any step that could reduce the 
risk of another offense.”114 However, the court disagreed with the 
                                                 
107 Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1091. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Belleau v. Greene, No. 12-C-1198, 2013 WL 1975672 at *1 (E.D. Wis. 
2013). 
111 Id. at *5. 
112 Id. 
113 Amended Complaint at ¶¶1-4, Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (E.D. 
Wis. 2015) (No. 12-cv-1198). 
114 Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1092. 
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application of the statute to an individual who was no longer under any 
supervision, probation, or parole.115 The court stated: 
 
Having served his sentences for his crimes and been 
discharged from his civil commitment, Belleau’s liberty has 
thus been restored, subject to the limited disqualifications, 
such as the right to possess a firearm, that the law expressly 
allows. He is, moreover, legally presumed to be free, like the 
rest of us, to cho[o]se whether or not to engage in criminal 
conduct.116  
 
The question the court focused on was “whether such a person 
who has already served his sentence for his crimes and is no longer 
under any form of court ordered supervision can be forced by the State 
to wear such a device and to pay the State for the cost of monitoring 
him for the rest of his life” when it granted Belleau’s motion for 
summary judgment “on his ex post facto and Fourth Amendment 
claims.”117 Judge Griesbach found it unnecessary to address Belleau’s 
equal protection violation claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.118 
 
1. The District Court Found That the Statute Violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the Constitution 
 
The district court first examined whether applying the statute to 
Belleau was an ex post facto violation.119 Judge Griesbach answered 
the question in the affirmative.120 He rejected the State’s argument that 
                                                 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1092-93, 1110. 
118 Id. at 1092-93, 1111 n.6 (“Although Belleau also argues that the State's 
lifetime GPS tracking law violates his right to equal protection of the law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it is not necessary to address that issue, especially since the 
answer likely rises or falls with my analysis of his claims that the law violates his 
rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fourth Amendment.”) 
119 Id. at 1093-1104. 
120 Id. 
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the statute was not retroactive because it was triggered by Belleau’s 
release from civil commitment in 2010, not by the crime he committed 
twenty years prior.121 “[E]ven if it was the discharge from his civil 
commitment that made him subject to lifetime GPS monitoring, it was 
his previous criminal convictions that made him eligible for civil 
commitment in the first place.”122 There was no “subsequent 
misconduct” that would suggest otherwise.123  
After concluding that the statute applied to Belleau retroactively, 
the court turned its focus to whether the statute itself was a 
punishment.124 While Judge Griesbach could not ascertain the 
legislative intent behind the statute regarding punishment, he did 
highlight that the execution of the statute itself was in the hands of the 
DOC, whose purpose was to “provide ‘correction’ to people who 
engage[d] in criminal conduct.”125 The statute itself can be found in a 
section that “governs corrections,” but that fact by itself is not 
dispositive because Wisconsin’s sex offender registry is located under 
the same section, and it has been declared “not to be punitive.”126 
Historically, the court observed, the supervision of persons was 
“regarded as a traditional form of punishment.”127 Moreover, if 
Belleau failed to charge the device or tampered with it, he would face 
a hefty fine or imprisonment.128 Judge Griesbach noted that the public 
shaming that accompanied the wearing of an ankle monitor further 
tipped the scale toward punishment.129 Belleau would not be able to 
wear shorts or change in a public dressing room if he did not want his 
                                                 
121 Id. at 1094. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1095. 
125 Id. at 1096. 
126 Id. (citing Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F. Supp. 2d 897, 906 (D. Wis. 2012), aff'd 
in part and rev'd in part by Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014)). 
127 Id. at 1098. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1099. 
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device discovered.130 Additionally, the required payment of $50 per 
month “ha[d] the effect of a fine, another traditional form of 
punishment imposed by the State on criminal defendants.”131 
The court also considered the time Belleau was obligated to spend 
dealing with the device. He was required to plug it into an outlet one 
hour each day.132 While there are many devices today that take about 
an hour a day to be fully charged, most do not require a person to 
remain near the outlet during that time.133 According to the court, this 
added up to 75 days over five years, not including the time Belleau 
had to spend waiting to let technicians into his home.134 Admittedly, 
the goal of the statute is to protect the public because “a person subject 
to GPS supervision is believed to be less likely to re-offend since he 
knows he will be caught.”135 However, that “is simply deterrence by 
another name,” and deterrence can be a form of punishment.136 
Judge Griesbach concluded that the Wisconsin law violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because “the effects of the law 
[were] so punitive that they negate[d] the legislature’s non-punitive 
intent.”137 He then turned his attention to Belleau’s Fourth Amendment 
violation claim.138 
 
2. The District Court Found That the Statute Violated the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution 
 
Relying on Grady v. North Carolina, the district court concluded 
that GPS monitoring of a person implicated the Fourth Amendment.139 
                                                 
130 Id. 




135 Id. at 1102. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1104. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. (citing Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015)). 
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However, because “the Fourth Amendment prohibits only 
unreasonable searches,” not all searches fall into this category.140 
Reasonableness “depends on the totality of the circumstances, 
including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which 
the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.”141 If the 
primary purpose of a search is to gather evidence, law enforcement is 
generally under an obligation to obtain a warrant.142 The existence of 
probable cause that a crime has been committed is necessary to 
convince a judge to sign a warrant.143 Accordingly, attaching a GPS 
monitoring device to a vehicle without a warrant was found to be 
unlawful in United States v. Jones.144 In Belleau’s case, the court found 
no probable cause.145  
Precedent leads to the conclusion that a search may be considered 
reasonable without a warrant in some cases but still “requires a 
balancing of the individual privacy interests at stake against the needs 
of the public.”146 In Samson v. California, for example, “the Court 
upheld a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee” while 
acknowledging the “high levels of recidivism in California and the 
State's strong interest in reducing that rate and promoting reintegration 
of people released from prison into the community.”147 However, in 
Samson, the offender consented to the search as a condition of his 
parole.148 While holding that the GPS monitoring program in Belleau’s 
case violated the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that his 
expectation of privacy was higher than the parolee in Samson because 
                                                 
140 Id. (quoting Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. (citing Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). 
143 Id. at 1105 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 
(1989)). 
144 Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1105 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 948-49 (2012)). 
145 Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1105. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1105-06 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)). 
148 Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1106 (citing Samson, 547 U.S. at 852). 
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Belleau fully served his sentence.149 At the same time, the court 
acknowledged the unquestionable “importance of protecting children 
from sexual assault or the devastating effects of such crimes,” which is 
why states could include lifetime GPS monitoring in punishments for 
serious crimes.150 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Reversed the District Court 
 
The State appealed the lower court’s decision to grant Belleau’s 
motion for summary judgment.151 Judge Posner, who delivered the 
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
focused heavily on the nature of Belleau’s crimes when he reversed 
the district court’s holding.152 The court also noted that pedophilia was 
not curable and predisposed offenders to molest children.153 The court 
quoted the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center psychologist who 
“concluded that Mr. Belleau had not shown that he could suppress or 
manage his deviant desire.”154 Although Belleau’s age may have 
reduced the probability that he would commit another crime against a 
child, the court noted that these types of offenses are especially 
heinous due to the deep psychological scars that follow and the 
shocking level of underreporting.155 Though Belleau’s supervision 
ended, he had not become harmless.156 “[W]e doubt that the 
community would or should be reassured by a psychologist’s guess 
that a pedophile has ‘only’ (say) a 49 percent chance of reoffending, or 
even the 16 percent chance estimated in this case.”157 
                                                 
149 Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1108. 
150 Id. 
151 Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2016). 
152 Id. at 932. 
153 Id. at 932-33. 
154 Id. at 933. 
155 Id. at 933-34. 
156 Id. at 934. 
157 Id. 
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With these factors in mind, the court announced that “persons 
who have demonstrated a compulsion to commit very serious crimes 
and have been civilly determined to have a more likely than not 
chance of reoffending must expect to have a diminished right of 
privacy as a result of the risk of their recidivating."158 The Seventh 
Circuit went on to compare Belleau’s current state of privacy under the 
existing sex offender registry law to the added loss of his privacy 
under the GPS monitoring statute and concluded that this additional 
loss was merely incremental: “it just identifies locations.”159 
 
1. The Seventh Circuit Found no Fourth Amendment Violation 
 
The court cited Grady as an indication that GPS monitoring of sex 
offenders was valid under the Fourth Amendment as long as the search 
itself was reasonable.160 Although continuously keeping track of 
Belleau’s locations can generate evidence if he does decide to commit 
another heinous crime against a child, the primary goal of the 
monitoring statute is to deter him from doing so.161 Even his own 
attorney admitted that lifetime monitoring of a child sex offender 
would not offend the Fourth Amendment if it was part of the 
punishment or a condition of parole.162 
The court was not particularly convinced that the GPS monitor 
was a burden on Belleau, but even if it was, it had to “be balanced 
against the gain to society from requiring that the anklet monitor be 
worn.”163 At least one study in California pointed to the likelihood that 
parolees wearing such devices were less likely to be re-arrested for a 
new sex offense.164 Society benefits if law enforcement can easily 
identify the locations of sex offenders when a victim reports a sexual 
                                                 
158 Id. at 935. 
159 Id. at 936. 
160 Id. at 932 (citing Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015)). 
161 Id. at 935. 
162 Id. at 935-36. 
163 Id. at 936. 
164 Id. 
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assault.165 Judge Posner noted that even sex offenders would benefit 
from this statute.166 They are provided with a rock solid alibi if they 
were nowhere near the crime scene.167 More broadly, the court noted 
that the balance of Belleau’s rights against the goal of protecting 
children weighed in favor of protection. “Given how slight is the 
incremental loss of privacy from having to wear the anklet monitor, 
and how valuable to society (including sex offenders who have gone 
straight) the information collected by the monitor is, we can't agree 
with the district judge that the Wisconsin law violates the Fourth 
Amendment.”168 
Belleau argued that the monitoring required a search warrant, 
which was not necessary under the statute.169 The court disagreed, 
calling the idea “absurd.”170 Police officers use surveillance techniques 
to keep an eye on a neighborhood where illegal drug dealing is 
suspected.171 They use hidden cameras to record drivers who run a red 
light.172 No warrant is required in either case because these techniques 
are considered “investigative surveillance.”173 Furthermore, because 
DOC agents could follow Belleau after he left his house, there is no 
reason why they couldn’t utilize a GPS tracking device to achieve the 
same result.174 With that said, the court concluded that there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation because Belleau’s monitoring was 
reasonable under the circumstances.175 
 
 










174 Id. at 936-37. 
175 Id. at 937. 
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2. The Seventh Circuit Found no Ex Post Facto Violation 
 
Next, the Seventh Circuit turned its attention to Belleau’s claim 
that the GPS monitoring statute was an ex post facto law.176 While the 
statute did take effect after Belleau had committed his crimes, the ex 
post facto rule only applies to statutes that impose punishments.177 The 
court briefly discussed Kansas v. Hendricks, a case in which the 
Supreme Court held that civil commitments of sex offenders were 
considered prevention, not punishment.178 Drawing on this case, Judge 
Posner declared that if civil commitment was not punishment, neither 
was GPS monitoring.179 They both had the same goal: to prevent 
violent sex offenders from hurting children.180 The court continued 
with comparing the anklet monitor to posted speed limits.181 The same 
way speed limit signs inform a driver that he will face a fine if he 
doesn’t obey them, the GPS monitor informs the pedophile that he 
could be punished if he commits another crime.182 Because the court 
found that the lifetime tracking served a preventive purpose and was 
not intended as a punishment, they also concluded that the law did not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.183 
 
3. The Concurring Opinion Offered Slightly Different Justifications 
 
Judge Flaum concurred in judgment and authored a separate 
opinion.184 He focused on the need for balancing a person’s right to 
privacy against the state’s compelling interest in protecting children 
                                                 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997)). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 938. 
182 Id. 
183 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. 
184 Belleau, 811 F.3d at 938 (Flaum, J., concurring). 
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from sexual abuse.185 “These sexual predators victimize children, who 
may suffer from trauma from the assault for the rest of their lives.”186 
Because Belleau was no longer under any supervision, Judge Flaum 
turned to the special needs doctrine to find justification for the GPS 
monitoring statute.187 The doctrine applies to “suspicionless searches” 
that serve special needs and do not exist merely for gathering 
evidence.188 Because the primary goal of the tracking program was to 
reduce recidivism, it qualified as a special needs search.189 Judge 
Flaum acknowledged the tremendously important privacy interest at 
stake in this case, especially because Belleau fully served his sentence 
and was not a parolee.190 At the same time, Belleau’s expectation of 
privacy was not the same as an ordinary citizen’s due to “mandatory 
registration laws and civil commitment.”191 In this program, requiring 
a warrant just did not make sense because warrants are usually issued 
when there is a suspicion that a crime has been committed.192 Here, the 
goal was to prevent the crime from ever taking place.193 Therefore, the 
monitoring was “a reasonable special needs search,” and the Fourth 
Amendment was not violated.194 
Next, Judge Flaum turned his attention to the ex post facto 
claim.195 “Unquestionably, this law applies retroactively to 
Belleau.”196 From the language of the statute, Judge Flaum found it 
                                                 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 939. 
188 Id.; See 12 Wash. Prac., § 2736 “Special needs” exception, Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2016). 
189 Id. at 940. 




194 Id. at 939. 
195 Id. at 941. 
196 Id. 
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clear that the primary goal of the legislature was prevention.197 “The 
language of the monitoring statute indicates that the legislature’s 
objective was to protect children, not punish sex offenders.”198 He also 
considered whether, in spite of the lack of punitive intent, the law had 
a punitive effect.199 He relied on five of the seven “Mendoza-Martinez 
factors” the Supreme Court promulgated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez to guide his review.200 
 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation 
to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the 
inquiry, and may often point in differing directions.201 
 
GPS technology is “distinguishable from traditional forms of 
punishment” because it is “relatively new.”202 It is not like probation 
or parole because those “impose restrictions.” In this case, there were 
not any restrictions on where Belleau was able to go.203 Although 
Belleau complained of “public shaming” because the device 
occasionally became visible to others, it was not the objective of the 
statute.204 The minor inconvenience was not significant enough to be 
                                                 
197 Id. at 942. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 942-43. 
200 Id. 
201 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963). 
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called punitive.205 “[A]s GPS devices become smaller and batteries 
last longer, any affirmative restraint imposed by this law will, over 
time, become less and less burdensome.”206 The statute is similar to 
sex offender registries where the goal is not punishment but 
deterrence.207 Similarly, the primary goal is to protect children from 
such offenders, not to punish them.208  
Lastly, Judge Flaum found that the law was not excessive because 
pedophilia was simply not treatable.209 “Coupled with the particularly 
devastating consequences of their conduct, these offenders pose a 
unique—and perhaps insurmountable—challenge for conventional law 
enforcement techniques.”210 In the end, Judge Flaum came to the same 
conclusion as the majority: the GPS monitoring statute was not an ex 
post facto law.211 
 
III. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? 
 
A. States May Utilize GPS Technology to Monitor Sex Offenders for 
the Rest of Their Lives 
 
After Belleau v. Wall, States in the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction 
may freely monitor sex offenders for life, even if they fully served 
their sentences and are not under any form of supervision.212 
Considering that no warrant or court order is needed, the ruling 
appears to be in slight conflict with the district court judge’s statement 
that “[t]he State’s authority over the individual is not unlimited.”213 





209 Id. at 944. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 See id. at 938. 
213 See Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1110 (E.D. Wis. 2015). 
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The Supreme Court of the United States offered limited guidance 
on the issue. In Samson, the Court held that the suspicionless search of 
a parolee did not offend the Fourth Amendment, and because Donald 
Curtis Samson, the defendant in the case, was on parole “following a 
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm,” his 
expectation of privacy was drastically diminished.214 Although Belleau 
was not a parolee, because of the seriousness of his crimes and 
because there was a significant possibility that he would repeat them, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that his right to privacy was similarly 
reduced.215 In Grady v. North Carolina, Torrey Dale Grady, a 
convicted sex offender, argued that “his Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures” was violated when he 
was ordered to wear a GPS anklet monitor for the rest of his life.216 
The Supreme Court declared that such tracking did constitute a search 
implicating the Fourth Amendment, but it was only unconstitutional if 
it was unreasonable.217 Several states now allow or even require 
lifetime monitoring of sex offenders.218 
Ultimately, Grady and Samson suggest that the Supreme Court 
will find lifetime tracking programs constitutional, especially when 
considering the high rates of recidivism among sex offenders and the 
ongoing need to protect children from them.219 For now, the Court has 
left open the question whether lifetime GPS monitoring is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.220 Until and unless the Supreme Court 
or Congress says otherwise, tracking sex offenders for the remainder 
of their lives is permitted, even after they fully serve their sentences 
and complete their probations. 
                                                 
214 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 856 (2006). 
215 Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935. 
216 Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1369 (2015). 
217 Id. 
218 State Statutes Related to Jessica's Law, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/sexoffenders/NCSLs_Jessicas_Law_Summa
ry.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) 
219 See Grady, 135 S. Ct. 1368; Samson, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
220 Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371. 
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B. The Supreme Court Needs to Review Whether States are Permitted 
to Apply GPS Monitoring Laws Retroactively 
 
The Seventh Circuit conceded that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 
Constitution was implicated because the Wisconsin statute became 
effective long after Belleau had committed his crimes.221 To escape 
this limitation, the court relied on Kansas v. Hendricks, a case in 
which the Supreme Court concluded that the civil commitment of a 
violent sex offender was a preventive measure, not a punishment.222 
After Judge Posner declared that civil commitments and GPS 
monitoring were alike, the Ex Post Facto Clause was no longer an 
obstacle to the validity of the Wisconsin statute.223 
Other circuits have come to a different conclusion. In Riley, 
George C. Riley, a convicted sex offender, claimed that New Jersey’s 
Sex Offender Monitoring Act, a law that was passed two decades after 
his last offense, was additional punishment because it was no different 
than a form of supervision for life.224 The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey agreed with the defendant and concluded that the statute 
violated “both the federal and state constitutional guarantees against 
ex post facto laws.”225 In Commonwealth v. Cory, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts came to the same conclusion that GPS 
monitoring was punishment and could not be applied to a sex offender 
retroactively.226 
Several factors suggest that GPS monitoring is different from civil 
commitment. Tracking devices merely monitor an offender’s location 
and do not provide treatment similar to the ones available in civil 
commitment settings. Belleau, for example, spent time with a 
psychologist at the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center.227 
                                                 
221 Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016) 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 274 (2014). 
225 Id. at 275. 
226 Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 560 (Mass. 2009). 
227 Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 2015). 
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Additionally, the Wisconsin monitoring program, unlike the statute in 
Hendricks, does not provide for periodic judicial review.228 The main 
objective of the ankle monitor was to deter Belleau from repeating his 
crimes.229 The Hendricks Court, however, differentiated civil 
commitments from deterrence because pedophiles were “unlikely to be 
deterred by the threat of confinement.”230 Lastly, unlike the lifetime 
length of the GPS monitoring statute, an offender under civil 
commitment is not to “remain confined any longer than he suffers 
from a mental abnormality rendering him unable to control his 
dangerousness.”231 
The Supreme Court should weigh in on the disagreement among 
the lower courts and proclaim whether the retroactive application of 
GPS monitoring programs to sex offenders is an additional 
punishment or simply a preventive measure. In their current state, 
these programs look more like punishment and less like prevention 
because they penalize the offender for noncompliance.232 Even if the 
offender just forgets to charge the device, he may be in violation of the 
statute that could punish him with imprisonment or a hefty fine.233 
Today, better technology is available to keep batteries charged longer 
than a single day.234 There is no reason, other than perhaps cost, why 
the states could not design a more maintenance-free version of the 
ankle monitor. Additionally, if legislatures removed the threat of 
punishment from these programs, they would start looking more like 
preventive measures or even treatments. At a minimum, legislatures 
should consider incorporating mandatory satellite-based lifetime 
                                                 
228 See WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2006); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364 
(1997)). 
229 Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). 
230 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362-63. 
231 Id. at 364. 
232 See Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1090. 
233 Id. 
234 The PT8200 Mini GPS Personal Tracker With 30 Day Battery Life, 
LIVEVIEWGPS, https://www.liveviewgps.com/blog/the-pt8200-mini-gps-personal-
tracker-with-30-day-battery-life/ (last visit Jan. 29, 2017). 
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monitoring of repeat sex offenders in their sentencing guidelines to 




Due to the heinous nature of sexual assault, particularly the 
impact on children, there is tremendous pressure on courts to keep sex 
offenders under lifetime surveillance or supervision. Because of this 
pressure, courts struggle to find the right balance between the rights of 
felons to be free from unreasonable searches and retroactive 
application of laws against the rights of the public, including children, 
to be free from sexual violence.  
Surveillance is fairly common today, and many of the methods do 
not raise serious constitutional questions. Red light cameras, for 
example, are acceptable because they are installed on traffic signals 
and monitor public roads. Perhaps monitoring by using drone 
technology could also fall into the permitted category. However, the 
moment monitoring devices are attached to individuals or their 
vehicles, the government is crossing into a world protected by the 
Constitution. These lifetime GPS tracking programs are powerful tools 
that allow offenders to re-enter society and deter them from repeating 
their crimes, but states should proceed with caution and design their 
programs without violating the Constitution’s prohibition against 
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